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Abstract 
This research paper evaluates the effect political gender quotas on female labor force 
indicators in South America, specifically labor force participation (formal sector) and 
unemployment. There has been significant progress within the region, with respect to lessening 
gender inequality, however the focus on access to educational opportunities maybe overstating 
the reduction in current gender inequality indices and their calculations (UNDP, 2015). Instead 
of focusing on the impact education or access to educational attainment, this research specifically 
analyzes the impact of political gender quotas on the female labor force. To measure the impact 
of these quota policies, this paper will use World Bank and International Labour Organization 
data on female labor force participation and unemployment in South America (excluding 
Suriname, Guyana and French Guyana), to analyze pre and post policy effects and their 
significance. 
 
Keywords: gender equality, politics, labor force participation, econometrics, economics, social 
welfare, public policy, unemployment, gender studies, macroeconomics, economic development, 
gender, quota, labor force 
 
Introduction 
This research paper evaluates the effect political gender quotas on female labor force 
indicators in South America, specifically labor force participation (formal sector) and 
unemployment. There has been significant progress within the region, with respect to lessening 
gender inequality, however the focus on access to educational opportunities maybe overstating 
the reduction in current gender inequality indices and their calculations (UNDP, 2015). Instead 
of focusing on the impact education or access to educational attainment, this research specifically 
 analyzes the impact of political gender quotas on the female labor force. To measure the impact 
of these quota policies, this paper will use World Bank and International Labour Organization 
data on female labor force participation and unemployment in South America (excluding 
Suriname, Guyana and French Guyana), to analyze pre and post policy effects and their 
significance.  
Within the region, eight out of ten countries since 1991 have implemented various forms 
of gender inclusive political quota systems. The intentions behind these policies is to increase 
female empowerment, political participation, and reduce gender inequality within the region. 
According to the World Bank, women comprise approximately 49.5% of the total world 
population making female contributions to the labor force and critical to overall economic 
growth(Bank, 2015; International IDEA, 2015). 
Latin America and the Caribbean is an interesting case for gender specific policies and 
their potential impact in creating gender inclusiveness and increasing female labor force 
participation rates. While substantial developments have been made in that region continues to 
be large gender pay discrepancies, high levels of female unemployment, and lack of employment 
opportunities for women in the formal labor market. The shift in focus towards gender specific 
policies, making gender inclusion mandatory, assumes that increased female political 
representation leads to upticks in societal and economic welfare. This assumption is far from 
casual effect as there are many other factors that lead to economic growth and more efficient 
labor force. It’s important to note, while policies may be focused on inclusion, some research has 
indicated that social perception and societal norms may contradict and even negate gender 
inclusive policies (Berik, van der Meulen Rodgers, & Seguino, 2009; Klasen & Lamanna, 2009).  
Regardless, interest in the link between gender inequality and its greater implications 
regarding the economy has gained popular momentum in the recent years, as more and more 
developing nations are under pressure to create more gender equal societies. While many nations 
of the world have made substantial progress towards equality there are still areas needing 
improvement. According to the United Nations, Beijing summit (1995) focused on gender 
equality, while Latin America has made undeniable progress, meeting gender parity in 
educational attainment, the lack of equality within the labor force, as well as the political realm 
has given critics cause for concern (ECLAC, 2016). Since the implementation of political gender 
quotas, several South American countries have seen an increase in female political participation, 
 but have these policies proven to be effective in creating a more inclusive labor force. The 
question rest on the significance and effectiveness of gender specific policies, like the quotas in 
South America, and if they are indeed instrumental in creating inclusive environments that foster 
economic growth.  
 
Literature Review 
 The UNDP’s Gender Inequality Index (GII) measures gender equity based on three 
overarching dimensions: health, empowerment and labour market (UNDP, 2015). Even with 
these three oversimplified dimensions, one can make assumptions regarding the implications 
associated with gender inequality in any given society and the world. For this reason, 
understanding and correcting negative externalities and failures caused by female gender 
discrimination are heavily researched by social scientists from all disciplines. (Pande & Ford, 
2012) address several implications associated with gender inclusive policies from efficiency and 
equity stand points. From the equity aspect, they identify that female inclusion policies may 
improve descriptive representation and substantive representation. They argue that increasing 
female presence within leadership positions can aid in correcting market failures within the labor 
force associated with preventing or penalizing advancement opportunities for women. Similarly, 
some empirical studies  suggest that while gender inequality is an equitable concern, reducing its 
implications to only discrimination, well-being and social injustice ignores the broader economic 
and developmental impacts (Klasen & Lamanna, 2009; Seguino, 2008). Even though injustices 
related to gender inequality and desire for increased descriptive representation may be 
motivating from a social welfare aspect, these studies suggest that increasing substantive 
representation can be a catalyst economically and politically.  
Some researchers point to a growing body of empirical evidence from the United States 
and India that suggest that men and women vary greatly with regards to their policy preferences 
(Pande & Ford, 2012). They also suggest that increased substantive representation leads to an 
increase in women’s policy initiatives. With a shift in female political participation and changes 
in policy preference, the potential for spill over into other sectors within the economy. This is 
directly related to the efficiency argument, in Gender Inequality and Growth, where the authors 
suggest that reducing gender barriers can result in casual positive relationships within female 
 education, labor and healthcare resources leading to economic growth (Klasen & Lamanna, 
2009).  
 While the authors acknowledge the reverse causality associated with reducing gender 
inequality and economic growth, they also urge that increasing efficiency in the overall labor 
force has a sizable positive impact on economic growth(Klasen & Lamanna, 2009). In that 
respect, additional research also suggest that implementing political gender quotas can reduce 
taste discrimination and social norms while correcting beliefs about the benefit of female labor 
(Pande & Ford, 2012). That being said, an increased presence of political gender quotas may lead 
to spill over and have greater implications for the female labor force, as well as economic 
growth, productivity and the efficiency of labor.  
 
Background 
I. Types of Quotas 
The Quota Project identifies three types of political gender quotas currently being 
employed: voluntary party quotas, candidate quotas and reserved seats. Voluntary candidate 
quotas vary significantly from country to country and like the name suggest are voluntary. These 
quotas typically require that the candidate lists of political parties must include a certain 
percentage of female options. The voluntary nature of these types of quotas make them difficult 
to enforce and measure their significant impact. The second type of quota is legislated candidate 
quota; these quotas legally require that a percentage of candidate positions are reserved for 
women. However, some studies question the effectiveness of these types of quotas, suggesting 
they are better at changing attitudes and social norms rather than increasing female leadership 
and political representation (Esteve-Volart & Bagues, 2012; Pande & Ford, 2012). Lastly, 
reserved seat quotas mandate that certain number of seats within legislative bodies can only be 
held by female candidates. As of 2011, only 20% of countries implementing quota systems 
mandated reserved seat quotas (Pande & Ford, 2012). Legislative candidate quotas are the most 
commonly used type of quota in South America. Even though nearly half of the countries in the 
world have implemented political gender quotas, their implementation and effectiveness has 
been met with mixed reviews and success (Duflo, 2012; International IDEA, 2015; Self & 
Grabowski, 2009). 
  
 II. South America and Quotas 
In 1991, Argentina was the first country in the region to implement a policy that focused 
on the mandatory integration of women into politics. This policy was to increase female political 
participation, empowerment and decrease gender inequality by creating an environment of 
inclusion (International IDEA, 2015). The original legislature, focused on political party lists, 
requiring the lists to be comprised of at least 30% female candidates. In 1993, the law was 
expanded to include mandatory minimum allocation of seats to women based on number of open 
positions ranging from 20 – 50% of total available vacancies (Bank, 2015; International IDEA, 
2015). Since Argentina in 1991, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay, have all 
implemented quota systems, these range from policies focused on candidate lists for political 
parties to electoral law requiring parliamentary positions to filled by women.  
 
Within South America’s Latino Americano region, there have been two countries that 
have abstained from enacting gender quotas within their political systems, Venezuela and Chile. 
In 1994, Venezuela attempted to enact a quota, requiring 30% of representatives on candidate 
lists to be women, however the quota was deemed unconstitutional before the next election could 
take place in 2000 (International IDEA, 2015). In Chile, a similar quota has been sitting in limbo, 
unable to gain parliamentary ratification, despite the country having a female president.  
 
 
Over the last 30 years, South America has not only seen substantial gains for women in 
the political realm, but also in educational attainment. Female educational attainment has been 
on the rise globally, and South America provides clear and compelling evidence to support this 
Table 1: Descriptive table showing year of quota implementation by country 
 trend. However, this paper will solely focus on the impact of political gender quotas and their 
correlation to labor force participation and employment opportunities for women in South 
America, while using education and GDP growth as proxies for gender equality.   
 
Methodology 
This paper will use cross-sectional panel data, from 1990 to 2014, to observe and analyze 
trends in the female labor force and whether quota systems have had a significant effect. Country 
fixed effects (time dummies), will also be used to control for omitted variable bias. These time 
dummies will also control for the assumption that over time labor force participation will 
increase population grows, industrialization takes place etc.   The lack of political gender quotas 
in Chile and Venezuela, will provide a constant control group, while the other eight countries 
will act as a treatment group. While Chile and Venezuela are the constant controls, using binary 
indicators to indicate policy implementation date, since it varies by country, will also enrich the 
data within the treatment group, acknowledging and analyzing pre and post policy differences. 
Panel data will be drawn from The World Bank and ILO data sets for labor force indicators. It 
will include female labor force participation and unemployment (Bank, 2015, 2016).  
Current research and methodologies will be examined and reviewed to further isolate 
labor force indicators and the impacts of quota policies (Cuberes & Teignier, 2014; Klasen & 
Lamanna, 2009). This combined with literature on the effects and types of gender policies and 
their current uses and impacts the data will show if these types of policies can significantly 
change employment opportunities for women, regionally and possibly globally (Esteve-Volart & 
Bagues, 2012; Fodor & Horn, 2015; Seguino, 2008; Self & Grabowski, 2009; Vickstrom & 
González-Ferrer, 2016; You, 2016).  
  
Empirical Model 
This study will use OLS regression analysis for female labor force participation indicators 
will using proxies for education and economic growth to isolate policy impact. The proxy 
selected for education is gross secondary enrollment (female) and annual GDP growth rate for 
economic performance. The regression analysis equations are listed below: 
𝐹 − 𝐿𝐹𝑃 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 (15 +)𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 × (𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡,) +  𝛽3 × 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 
 𝐹 − 𝐿𝐹𝑃 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 (15 − 24) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2  (𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) +  𝛽3 × 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 
𝐹 − 𝐿𝐹𝑃 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 (15 − 64) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2  (𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) +  𝛽3 × 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 
𝐹: 𝑀 𝐿𝐹𝑃 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2  (𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) +  𝛽3 × 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 
𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝 (𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙; 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2  (𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) +  𝛽3 × 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 
𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝 (𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2  (𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) +  𝛽3 × 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡  
 
In addition to the simple regression equations listed additional regressions will be run using 
three perimeters. The first perimeter will be used to control for country and year omitted 
variables. To do this country and year fixed effects will be added to each regression to test 
significance and coefficients related to policy implementation. Then the regressions will be run 
using each fixed effect independently to control for any observable or unobservable predictors 
omitted within the model. The final regression will be run removing all fixed effects and solely 
focus on policy variable and its statistical significance.  
 
Results 
 
Table 2: OLS regression of female labor force participation and unemployment including country and year fixed effects. 
 
VARIABLES 
F-LFPR 
15 + 
F-LFPR 
15 – 24 
F-LFPR 
15 – 64 
F:M 
LFPR 
Unemployment 
(total; female) 
Youth 
Unemployment 
       
Policy (Q) 0.00525 -0.00371 0.00265 0.000531 -0.00423 -0.00633 
 (0.0111) (0.0138) (0.0113) (0.0112) (0.00667) (0.0105) 
Enrollment Rate -0.0514 -0.105** -0.0607 -0.0291 -0.0570*** -0.0758** 
 
 
(0.0366) (0.0454) (0.0373) (0.0367) (0.0216) (0.0339) 
Annual GDP 
growth  
0.147* 0.158 0.136 0.112 -0.0114 -0.0133 
 (0.0828) (0.103) (0.0843) (0.0831) (0.0487) (0.0766) 
Constant 0.493*** 0.505*** 0.530*** 0.572*** 0.149*** 0.260*** 
 (0.0318) (0.0395) (0.0324) (0.0320) (0.0166) (0.0261) 
       
Observations 175 175 175 175 173 173 
R-squared 0.673 0.209 0.709 0.778 0.564 0.525 
Number of 
country 
10 10 10 10 10 10 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Source: World Data Bank (Bank, 2015, 2016) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
Table 3: OLS regression of female labor force participation and unemployment using country fixed effect only. 
 
 F-LFPR F-LFPR F-LFPR F:M Unemployment Youth 
VARIABLES 15 + 15 – 24 15 – 64 LFPR (total; female) Unemployment 
       
Policy (Q) 0.0364*** 0.00937 0.0382*** 0.0409*** 0.00404 0.00967 
 (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0133) (0.0140) (0.00727) (0.0116) 
Enrollment Rate 0.193*** -0.0253 0.218*** 0.285*** -0.0885*** -0.0932*** 
 (0.0319) (0.0319) (0.0340) (0.0358) (0.0186) (0.0295) 
Annual GDP growth  0.0820 0.0109 0.0804 0.0826 -0.133*** -0.175** 
 (0.0757) (0.0755) (0.0806) (0.0850) (0.0436) (0.0694) 
Constant 0.329*** 0.431*** 0.349*** 0.375*** 0.179*** 0.288*** 
 (0.0240) (0.0239) (0.0255) (0.0269) (0.0141) (0.0224) 
       
Observations 175 175 175 175 173 173 
R-squared 0.366 0.005 0.383 0.463 0.191 0.097 
Number of country 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Source: World Data Bank (Bank, 2015, 2016) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: OLS regression of female labor force participation and unemployment using year fixed effect only. 
 F-LFPR F-LFPR F-LFPR F:M Unemployment Youth 
VARIABLES 15 + 15 – 24 15 – 64 LFPR (total; female) Unemployment 
       
Policy (Q) 0.0657*** 0.0966*** 0.0528*** 0.0587*** -0.0182*** -0.0502*** 
 (0.0112) (0.0150) (0.0116) (0.0119) (0.00704) (0.0118) 
Enrollment Rate -0.126*** -0.0807* -0.0128 0.00201 0.0724*** 0.261*** 
 (0.0334) (0.0447) (0.0347) (0.0355) (0.0214) (0.0359) 
Annual GDP growth  0.152 0.0151 0.0744 0.164 -0.132 -0.125 
 (0.158) (0.212) (0.165) (0.169) (0.0999) (0.168) 
Constant 0.493*** 0.451*** 0.457*** 0.496*** 0.0739*** 0.0536 
 (0.0482) (0.0645) (0.0501) (0.0513) (0.0226) (0.0379) 
       
Observations 175 175 175 175 173 173 
Number of country 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Country FE NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Source: World Data Bank (Bank, 2015, 2016) 
 Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1  
 Table 5: OLS regression of female labor force participation and unemployment excluding fixed effects. 
 
 F-LFPR F-LFPR F-LFPR F:M Unemployment Youth 
VARIABLES 15 + 15 – 24 15 – 64 LFPR (total; female) Unemployment 
       
Policy (Q) 0.0420*** 0.0132 0.0422*** 0.0460*** 0.000125 0.00138 
 (0.0121) (0.0122) (0.0128) (0.0135) (0.00705) (0.0114) 
Enrollment Rate 0.178*** -0.0301 0.208*** 0.272*** -0.0767*** -0.0694** 
 (0.0310) (0.0313) (0.0327) (0.0346) (0.0181) (0.0293) 
Annual GDP 
growth  
0.0798 0.00862 0.0776 0.0806 -0.133*** -0.173** 
 (0.0758) (0.0757) (0.0802) (0.0847) (0.0441) (0.0710) 
Constant 0.341*** 0.442*** 0.358*** 0.385*** 0.171*** 0.272*** 
 (0.0319) (0.0360) (0.0329) (0.0350) (0.0178) (0.0296) 
       
Observations 175 175 175 175 173 173 
Number of country 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Source: World Data Bank (Bank, 2015, 2016) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
The results in Table 2 do not show any statistical significance when using both country 
fixed effects and time fixed effects. By using fixed effects for both country and year variables 
this regression model will attempt to control for omitted variable bias within the observed group. 
An interpretation of this table would suggest that when employing fixed effects for both country 
and time, the implementation of gender quota policies, does not have a statistically significant 
effect on female labor force indicators.  
The regression was repeated in Table 3, however, in this regression the time fixed effect 
is removed. When time fixed effect is removed, policy implementation shows a statistically 
significant effect on several of the labor force indicators. In this regression, total labor force 
participation for those women over the age of 15 (F-LFPR 15+), labor force participation of 
women ages 15-64 (F-LFPR 15-64) and the ratio of females to males participating in the labor 
force (F:M LFPR). In the case of total female labor force participation of those over 15 (F-LFPR 
15+) and those between the ages of 15 to 64 (F-LFPR 15-64), the results show a positive 
relationship between policy implementation and labor force participation with coefficients of 
0.0364 and 0.0382 at a 99% confidence level. There is also a positive relationship with respect to 
the ratio of females to males participating in the labor force with a coefficient of 0.0404. While 
three of the endogenous variables tested show significance results, the other three variables 
 tested female labor force participation 15-24 and both unemployment indicators show no 
statistical significance. Removing the time fixed effects and holding the country fixed effects, 
limits the chance of omitted variable bias as it relates to each country within the test group, 
however, it does not account for omitted variables over time. While some variables tested show 
significance, removing fixed time effects this regression may fail to account for aggregate 
increase in female labor force indicators over time, not necessarily due to policy implementation.  
Perhaps the most robust and statistically significant results within this regression analysis 
occur when country fixed effects are removed and year fixed effects remain (Table 4). When 
running this regression, there was a statistically significant positive relationship in all labor force 
participation indicators and a corresponding negative relationship in both unemployment 
indicators. However, interpreting these results as a direct result of policy implementation has 
significant limitations. Without using country fixed effects, the regression may include country 
specific effects into the model that may unintentionally influence results. Some other limitations 
may include, but are not limited to: a change in social values, change in opportunity cost of 
female employment or a change in labor force participation in the informal sector variation 
within the countries observed. 
Lastly the regression shown in Table 5, both fixed effects, country and year are removed. 
The results of this regression closely resemble those produced in Table 3 above. While there was 
a statistically significant positive relationship with regards to labor force participation of those 15 
and above and those 15 to 64, removing both country and time fixed effect from the regression 
eliminates controls for omitted variable bias. However, it should be noted that when both country 
and year fixed effects are removed from the regression the estimated coefficients associated with 
the implementation of the policy are approximately one percentage point higher than the results 
found in Table 3.  
 
Conclusion  
In conclusion, the regression analysis conducted in this study are inconclusive and cannot 
definitively to show a direct correlation between the implementation of political gender quotas 
and female labor force indicators. However, several of the regressions did show statistically 
significant results congruent with the hypothesis, that quota implementation can have a positive 
effect on labor force participation as well as a decrease in unemployment among women. The 
 statistical significance of these results, suggest that additional research and monitoring over time 
could prove insightful with regards to the future implications of other gender inclusive policies. 
Further in depth analysis into specific countries, over longer periods of time, may provide more 
comprehensive results.  
Continued research is needed to further identify the impact of political gender quotas and 
gender inclusive policies on the female labor force. There is some evidence that suggest that the 
type of quota implemented can determine the level of effectiveness on gender inclusivity and 
representation (Pande & Ford, 2012). Future research will provide more evidence on whether 
similar policies will have a significant effect on the formal labor market. Being as how, gender 
specific policies are still in infancy stages and lacking in long-run empirical data it will be an 
important future topic of research and the broader implications for gender equality around the 
world. 
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